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Following the financial collapse of 2008, both China and the 
United States implemented stimulus plans to minimize adverse 
market performance. Arguably the vertically integrated institutional 
structure of China produced a timely and homogenous plan that 
stimulated market performance. Conversely, the decentralized 
institutional structure of the United States produced a plan that was 
delinquent, discordant, and inefficacious. In other words, China’s 
stimulus plan had a closer fit between means and ends. 
This Comment compares each country’s policy response through 
the lens of its institutional environment, and explores the relationship 
between individual liberty and institutional arrangement. Part I lays 
down a conceptual framework for analyzing how institutional 
environment affects market performance; Part II synopsizes the 
institutional arrangements of the United States and China; and Part III 
comparatively details each country’s policy response to the financial 
collapse. Conclusions and inferences follow in Part IV. 
I 
TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS AND NEW INSTITUTIONAL 
ECONOMICS 
Economics measures the irreducible fulcrum of government––
“who, whom?”1––against market performance.2 Transaction Cost 
Economics (TCE) simplifies the relationship between resource 
allocation and market performance by conceptualizing resource 
allocation as a series of contractual transactions and categorizing 
them according to their organizational mode.3 Thusly, market 
performance is a function of how resource allocation transactions are 
ordered. 
New Institutional Economics (NIE) expands on the transaction-
centric framework of TCE and seeks to explain variations in national 
market performances by examining the role that social institutions 
play in determining market organizational modes. Formalistically, the 
marriage of TCE and NIE provides a conceptual scaffold to 
	
1 E.g., Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, Report To The Second All-Russia Congress of Political 
Education Departments: The New Economic Policy (Oct. 17, 1921) (“кто кого” literally 
means “who, whom?” it is more accurately translated as “who will win?”). More precisely, 
“who gets what, when, and how?” HAROLD LASSWELL, POLITICS: WHO GETS WHAT, 
WHEN, AND HOW (1935). 
2 Market performance is broadly defined as success in providing social benefits. 
3 OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 20–22 
(1985); Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of 
Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233, 233–35 (1979). 
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“identify[] and characteriz[e] alternative ways to organize transactions 
[and] . . . tools for analyzing the tradeoff among these modes.”4 The 
underlying rationale is syllogistic: the performance of a market 
economy depends on market organization; market organization is an 
expression of institutional environment; therefore, performance of a 
market economy depends on its institutional environment. 
This rest of this section elaborates on TCE and NIE, and explains 
how they can be used to compare the policy responses of both 
countries. Particular emphasis is placed on how a country’s 
institutional matrix affects the performance of its political and 
economic markets. 
A. Transaction Costs and Market Organization 
“Economics is the science which studies human behaviour as a 
relationship between ends and scarce means which have alternative 
uses.”5 The neoclassical school examined this relationship between 
resource allocation and market efficiency by assuming a “frictionless” 
model where transactions occurred instantaneously and without any 
cost.6 While this conceptual simplification was instrumental in 
developing an understanding of production costs, there are, of course, 
a myriad of costs appurtenant to market organization, viz., costs 
incurred in “identifying and matching potential buyers and sellers.”7 
Thus, in order to “[d]imensionaliz[e] transactions and examin[e] the 
costs of executing different transactions in different ways,” a more 
nuanced analytic framework was required.8 
TCE rejects the orthodox assumption of frictionless markets, and 
assumes “that individuals have incomplete information and limited 
mental capacity and because of this they face uncertainty about 
unforeseen events and outcomes and incur transaction costs to acquire 
	
4 Claude Ménard, A New Institutional Approach to Organization, in THE HANDBOOK 
TO NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 281, 283 (Claude Ménard & Mary M. Shirley eds., 
2005). 
5 LIONEL ROBBINS, AN ESSAY ON THE NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF ECONOMIC 
SCIENCE 15 (1932). 
6 WILLIAMSON, supra note 3, at 19. Three postulates underpin neoclassical economics: 
(1) individuals pursue their own self-interest; (2) individuals pursuing their own self-
interest respond to incentives predictably; and (3) individuals pursuing their own self-
interest in mutually voluntary exchange benefits society by driving resources to their most 
efficient uses. See RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3-10 (7th ed. 2007). 
7 Ménard, supra note 4, at 306. 
8 Williamson, supra note 3, at 259. 
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information.”9 So, transaction costs are appurtenant to making an 
economic exchange; especially those costs incurred by institutional 
innovations designed to excise “uncertainty about unforeseen events 
and outcomes,” which results from imperfect information and 
bounded rationality.10 
TCE examines such costs according to their mode of economic 
organization.11 The two main alternative organizational modes, or 
“governance structures,” are hierarchies (interchangeably: firms, 
hierarchies, integrated, or centralized) and markets (interchangeably 
decentralized).12 The underlying premise is that organization affects 
market performance because “different internal structures carry 
distinct administrative costs.”13 
For example, “[i]f the costs of making an exchange are greater than 
the gains which that exchange would bring, that exchange would not 
take place.”14 Consequently, “[w]hen information is costly and 
property rights are poorly protected, contracts become hard to specify 
and enforce and transaction costs are high.”15 Ergo, “[s]ocieties with 
persistently higher transaction costs have less trade, fewer firms, less 
specialization, less investment, and lower productivity.”16 
Conversely, “where institutions increase the certainty that contracts 
will be honored and property protected, individuals will be more 
willing to specialize, invest in sunk assets, undertake complex 
transactions and accumulate and share knowledge.”17 It is this 
relationship between transaction costs and economic activity that 
ultimately determines why different institutional arrangements 
produce varying levels of market performance. Indeed, the “key 
feature of markets in a transaction costs perspective is that they are 
	
9 Claude Ménard & Mary M. Shirley, Introduction to THE HANDBOOK OF NEW 
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 1, 1 (Claude Ménard & Mary M. Shirley eds., 2005). For 
example, buyers incur costs in acquiring and processing information to make use of prices; 
by corollary, sellers incur costs by trying to alleviate the buyer’s burden. 
10 Id. 
11 WILLIAMSON, supra note 3, at 19. The neoclassical school recognized these costs 
were important in principle, but neglected to incorporate them because it but lacked a 
conceptual framework to describe them. Id. 
12 Menard, supra note 4, at 294. A third category is a market-hierarchy “hybrid.” Id. 
13 Id. at 293. 
14 Ronald H. Coase, Nobel Prize Lecture for Economics (Dec. 9, 1991), available at 
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1991/coase-lecture.html. 
15 Mary M. Shirley, Institutions and Development, in THE HANDBOOK OF NEW 
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 611, 613 (Claude Ménard & Mary M. Shirley eds., 2005). 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 614. 
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organized,” which means “markets are embedded in institutions that 
shape them[, and therefore] can take a variety of forms depending on 
the ‘rules of the game.’”18 So, if economic organization depends on 
transaction costs, and transaction costs depend on and drive 
institutional environment, what determines institutional environment? 
B. New Institutionalism and Political-Economic Performance 
TCE forms the core of NIE: in both, the fundamental unit of 
analysis is the transaction; all economic activity is conceptualized as 
contractual; organizational modes are categorized discriminately; and 
analytic focus is on apportionment of contracting costs.19 But NIE 
also goes further than TCE: NIE weaves together the interrelated 
concepts of transaction costs, social institutions, and political 
economy into a coherent framework that bridges the gap between the 
immutable frictionless world of neoclassical orthodoxy and the “real 
world” of continuous change and uncertainty.20 This section 
introduces NIE as “the study of the process of economic change” as a 
consequence of a constantly shifting landscape of organizations 
operating within institutional matrices.21 
“[I]n order to understand and improve economic performance,” 
NIE employs a game-theoretic approach where “[i]nstitutions are the 
rules of the game,” “[o]rganizations are the players,” and the ultimate 
objective is survival.22 Institutions themselves are divided into two 
classes: formal rules and informal norms.23 The sum of these 
institutions and their enforcement mechanisms embodies the 
institutional matrix that “defines the opportunity set.”24 In other 
words, institutional incentive structure (itself determined by 
transaction costs) defines the parameters of organizational activity, 
which, in turn, dictate market activity. 
Organizations themselves are groups of individuals, united by a 
common interest, that compete for scarce resources, and are roughly 
	
18 Ménard, supra note 4, at 303–04. 
19 WILLIAMSON, supra note 3, at 18–21. 
20 Douglass C. North, Institutions and the Performance of Economies Over Time, in 
THE HANDBOOK OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 21, 21 (Claude Ménard & Mary M. 
Shirley eds., 2005). 
21 Ménard & Shirley, supra note 9, at 2. 
22 North, supra note 20, at 22. 
23 Ménard & Shirley, supra note 9, at 1. Examples of formal institutions include 
constitutions, laws, contracts, and regulations; informal institutions, on the other hand, 
structure and inculcate “norms of conduct, beliefs and habits of thought and behavior.” Id. 
24 North, supra note 20, at 23. 
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categorized as either economic or political.25 While immediate 
objectives vary depending on organizational category––e.g., profit 
maximization for economic organizations, and likelihood of 
reelection for political organizations––the ultimate objective is always 
the same: survival.26 Consequently, competition for resources induces 
organizations to invest in skills and knowledge that they perceive to 
possess the highest anticipated rates of return.27 Thus, institutional 
environment determines not only what organizations emerge, but also 
subsequent organizational activity. 
Because the relationship between organizations and institutions is 
reciprocal, rather than unidirectional, institutional environment is 
constantly in flux.28 The key to understanding institutional 
environment is that the “continuous interaction between institutions 
and organizations in the economic setting of . . . competition” 
determines which organizations emerge as well as which 
organizations survive.29 Unsurprisingly, organizations seek a 
competitive advantage by manipulating the institutional environment. 
Several organizations competing in advancing self-interested 
institutional change––or a market for institutional change where 
purchasers are organizations––produces institutional change that is 
incremental and path dependent.30 By corollary, institutions that 
promote prosperity for long enough are eventually “traditionalized,” 
and those traditions that are best suited for human flourishing 
progressively displace less prosperous institutions.31 Institutional 
	
25 Id. at 22. Economic organizations include “firms, trade unions, [and] cooperatives;” 
political organizations include “political parties, legislatures, [and] regulatory bodies.” Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 23. 
28 Id. at 22. “The immediate vehicle by which the actors attempt to shape their 
environment is by altering the institutional framework in order to improve their (and their 
organizations’) competitive position.” Id. 
29 Id. Ergo, transaction costs cannot be immutable. 
30 Id. at 24. In other words, extant social institutions and organizations are the result of 
an iterative communal trial and error process. This evolutionary conception of institutions 
forms the basis of Burkean-Hayekian conservatism. See, e.g., FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE 
FATAL CONCEIT 18 (1988); FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE POLITICAL ORDER OF A FREE 
PEOPLE 157 (1979); FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 128 (1976); 
Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, in 2 SELECT WORKS OF EDMUND 
BURKE (1999) (1790); Edmund Burke, Thoughts and Details on Scarcity, in 4 SELECT 
WORKS OF EDMUND BURKE 51, 92 (1999) (1795). For a comparison of Burke and Hayek, 
see Linda C. Raeder, The Liberalism / Conservatism of Edmund Burke and F. A. Hayek: A 
Critical Comparison, 10 HUMANITAS 70 (1997), available at http://www.nhinet.org 
/humsub/raeder.htm. 
31 FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 54–70 (1960). 
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matrices thus determine organizational genesis, expiry, and activity 
during the interim. The central thesis of this evolutionary perspective, 
as opposed to the hypothesis that institutions are the product of 
deliberative design, is that a society’s oldest traditions encapsulate 
“superindividual wisdom”––the most successful collective 
experiences of society’s forbearers––and therefore more knowledge 
than any organization could possibly aggregate in one lifetime.32 
In sum, societies create institutions to reduce risk and uncertainty 
in contracting engendered by bounded rationality and imperfect 
information. Organizations emerge and operate within the existing 
institutional framework, and try to improve their competitive position 
partly by deliberately trying to shape the competitive environment to 
their advantage. Yet, interference by an ordinary organization very 
likely neglects the extraordinary corpus of knowledge embodied 
within society’s successful institutions. Indeed, the disjunctive tension 
between self-interest and the common good is recurrent in analysis of 
political institutional environments: self-interested activity raises 
transaction costs, which lower overall economic activity, thereby 
decreasing the communal standard of living. 
II 
INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT OF CHINA AND 
THE UNITED STATES 
The initial task of new-institutional analysis is identification of 
relevant institutions and organizations. Comparative examination of 
the national policy responses of China and the United States to the 
financial collapse implicates institutions of governance, economics, 
and politics. Further circumscription of institutional matrices is 
country dependent. 
The next threshold task is categorization of each institution 
according to organizational mode, but abstractions such as 
decentralized and centralized governance structures need some 
explanation before they can be useful differentiating principles. 
Friedrich A. Hayek’s seminal article The Use of Knowledge in Society 
periphrastically delineates and compares centralized and market 
organizational modes, and is a microcosm of the broader contest 
between collectivism and individualism.33 The rest of Part II is broken 
	
32 Id. at 110. 
33 Friedrich A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 
(1945). 
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down into three sections: section A distinguishes centralized from 
decentralized organizational modes, and sections B and C synthesize 
apposite institutional matrices of China and the United States, 
respectively. 
A. Use of Knowledge in Society 
Prices communicate supplementary information to actors so they 
can “fit [their] decisions into the whole pattern of changes of the 
larger economic system.”34 Hayek’s identification of the price 
mechanism within market organization as a particularly efficient 
information processor starts with two uncontroversial claims: the 
most efficient utilization of resources at a particular time and place is 
unique; and knowledge of those circumstances is distributed among 
many separate individuals. Consequently, one of the main difficulties 
in establishing a rational order concerns “the utilization of knowledge 
not given to anyone in its totality.”35 
1. Organization of Economic Institutions 
Taxonomically, there are two classes of arrangements, which 
overlap with TCE’s hierarchy-market distinction: centralized and 
decentralized.36 In the context of knowledge utilization, centralized 
arrangements direct “the whole economic system according to one 
unified plan” promulgated by a central planning authority.37 
Conversely, in decentralized arrangements, many separate individuals 
pursuing their own self-interest determine all economic activity. Yet 
this distinction merely trades one inquiry for another: The evaluative 
inquiry is which system adapts more quickly to rapid fluctuations “in 
the particular circumstances of time and place?”38 
At the outset, centralized arrangements face the formidable task of 
gathering all “the dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently 
contradictory knowledge which all the separate individuals 
possess.”39 But knowledge of time and place, alone, is insufficient to 
allocate all of a society’s resources; in addition, the central authority 
	
34 Id. at 525. 
35 Id. at 520. 
36 There is also a “half-way house between the two” which delegates “planning to 
organized industries, or, in other words, monopoly.” Id. at 521; see supra note 12. 
37 Hayek, supra note 33, at 521. 
38 Id. at 524. “[E]conomic problems arise always and only in consequence of change.” 
Id. at 523; see supra note 29. 
39 Hayek, supra note 33, at 519. 
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would also need a given system of preferences, as well as “complete 
knowledge of available means.”40 Only once the central authority 
concatenated those three variables could it begin to calculate one 
unified plan to direct the whole of economic activity. 
Centralized arrangements are impracticable as a consequence of 
two incurable flaws. The first concerns size: a national economy has 
hundreds of millions participants, and each participant has a unique 
spectrum of knowledge and preference. Assuming a central authority 
knew what knowledge was needed, the authority would be faced with 
a choice on how best to collect the knowledge: ask each individual 
market participant or rely on statistical aggregates? One only need 
consider difficulties observed in national census taking before 
selecting statistical aggregation as a matter of necessity. But, 
aggregation “lump[s] together, as resources of one kind, items which 
differ as regards location, quality, and other particulars.”41 Indeed, the 
specificity and granularity of time and place frustrate statistical 
aggregation, and the alternative individualized polling, is unrealistic. 
It is thus uncertain how a central planning authority would obtain the 
knowledge of time and place. 
The second incurable flaw of centralized arrangements has to do 
with the practical consequence of time. Even if the central authority 
managed to acquire and compute the requisite knowledge, it would 
only provide a plan for the circumstances of time and place that the 
knowledge was based on. Such a plan, frozen in time, might 
theoretically be adequate if the conditions upon which it was based 
remained fixed. However, the circumstances of time and place are not 
unchanging; to the contrary, they are fluid and dynamic: “The 
continuous flow of goods and services is maintained by constant 
deliberate adjustments, by new dispositions made every day in the 
light of [the] circumstances” of time and place.42 
Consequently, a comprehensive economic plan would be outdated 
before it could ever be complete, let alone disseminated, 
implemented, and enforced. It is this consequence of temporal 
impossibility, along with the intractable problem of obtaining 
adequately detailed knowledge, that frustrates centralized economic 
planning. As discussed below, the problems of knowledge 
particularity and temporal impossibility and derivatives thereof, or 
	
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 524. 
42 Id. 
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sufficiently rapid adaptation, are principle impediments to 
centralization in other institutions as well. 
The alternative, decentralized, or market organizational modes, 
leverage the initial dispersal of knowledge and try to determine how 
much additional information the “man on the spot”43 needs to fit their 
“decisions into the whole pattern of changes of the larger economic 
system.”44 This presents two distinct challenges that routinely 
frustrate market organization: knowledge dissemination and 
channeling individual self-interest towards socially desirable 
outcomes. Indeed, these two challenges are the primary impediments 
to decentralization, and comparing them with the impediments of 
integration––knowledge particularity and temporal impossibility––
encapsulate the trade-off between integrated and market 
organizational arrangements. Unlike the intractable challenges 
associated with centralization, the institutions of market exchange and 
the price-mechanism solve the challenges inherent to decentralization. 
The first challenge of knowledge dissemination actually presents 
two distinct questions: what information needs to be disseminated, 
and how is it communicated? The first question can be further 
reduced to the simpler interrelated inquiries of quantity and quality. In 
other words, (1) how much knowledge does the individual need; and 
(2) what is the character of requisite knowledge? The answers lay in 
the point of view of the decision-maker: he or she is deciding between 
alternatives, choosing one thing and forsaking another. Accordingly, 
“[a]ll that is significant . . . is how much more or less difficult to 
procure [those things] have become compared with other things with 
which he [or she] is also concerned . . . . It is always a question of the 
relative importance of the particular things with which he [or she] is 
concerned . . . .”45 
With the requisite quantity and quality of supplementary 
information identified, the question becomes how to transmit that 
information. In practice, prices are abbreviations that communicate 
precisely the type of information with which individual market 
participants are concerned: relative difficulty of procurement. The 
price mechanism is thus a “system of signals which informs us, 
however imperfectly, of the effects of millions of events which occur 
	
43 “Man on the spot” is defined as a market participant with “limited but intimate 
knowledge of the facts of his [or her] immediate surroundings.” Id. at 524–25. 
44 Id. at 525. 
45 Id. 
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in the world, to which we have to adapt ourselves and about which we 
may have no direct information.”46 
The second challenge for decentralized institutional arrangements, 
after information dissemination, concerns control––information 
sufficiency is meaningless if market participants do not subsequently 
allocate resources amongst themselves. Put differently, there are not 
enough resources to satisfy every desire of each market participant, 
and the question is how to reconcile the multitude of contradictory 
plans. This too is solved by the price mechanism: when a resource 
becomes scarcer, its price increases; price-increases force market 
participants to use the resource and its derivatives more sparingly. 
Competing uses of the resource are reconciled by letting individuals 
make their own economic decisions, and resources are allocated 
according to which participant is willing to pay the increased price. 
Thus, “using prices as a guide, or as signals,” leads individuals “to 
serve the demands and enlist the powers and capacities of people of 
whom [they] knew nothing.”47 “The whole acts as one market, not 
because any of its members survey the whole field, but because their 
limited individual fields of vision sufficiently overlap so that through 
many intermediaries the relevant information is communicated to 
all.”48 However, if decentralized coordination was categorically 
superior, production firms would not have emerged in a market 
economy; yet they did. Therefore, there must be some advantage to 
hierarchical organizational modes in some circumstances. 
Production firms are organizations that turn inputs into outputs 
based on their guiding objectives and technological constraints. Such 
firms are faced with the “make or buy” decision: whether it is more 
economical to make, and thereby vertically integrate, a production 
input rather than it would be to acquire it through the market. “The 
main reason why it is profitable to establish a firm would seem to be 
that there is a cost of using the price mechanism,” viz., “discovering 
what the relevant prices are,” or transaction costs.49 Thus, hierarchy is 
a substitute for decentralized information asymmetry. 
	
46 Friedrich A. Hayek, The Moral Imperative of the Market, in THE UNFINISHED 
AGENDA: ESSAYS ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF GOVERNMENT POLICY IN HONOUR OF 
ARTHUR SELDON 142, 144 (Martin J. Anderson ed., 1986). 
47 Id. 
48 Hayek, supra note 33, at 526. 
49 Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 390 (1937). “[T]he 
distinguishing mark of the firm is the supersession of the price mechanism.” Id. at 389. 
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There are also philosophical justifications for preferring 
decentralized arrangements to their integrated counterparts. 
Specifically, central direction inevitably requires the use of coercion; 
yet, competitive capitalism does not.50 Instead, organizing the “bulk 
of economic activity through private enterprise operating in a free 
market” coordinates the activities of large numbers of people through 
mutually voluntary exchange.51 Central economic planning is thus 
incompatible with individual ordering of economic affairs,52 and some 
degree of competitive market exchange is a necessary, yet 
insufficient, condition to protect individuals from coercion.53 
2. Organization of Political Institutions 
An early extension of the study of organizational affect on 
economic decision-making was to nonmarket group decision-making, 
or political activity.54 Indeed, the potential advantages of 
centralization are pronounced in politics. For example, political 
information is often complex, costly to procure, and offers little 
benefit to those who do acquire it; so, the electorate may economize 
the acquisition of information by relying on political party ideology to 
direct their individual voting decisions.55 Political parties are thus 
both institution and organization. In the institutional sense, parties 
emerged to fill a lacuna in political information distribution arising 
out of governance institutional function. In the more narrow 
organizational sense, individual political parties aggregate, package, 
and transmit pertinent information to the electorate. 
Political parties are not the only groups negotiating the political-
institutional landscape; there are also small coalitions united by 
common self-interest, or interest groups. What distinguishes political 
parties from interest groups is their more narrow purpose: interest 
	
50 See 2 FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, The Road to Serfdom, in THE COLLECTED WORKS OF F. 
A. HAYEK (Bruce Caldwell ed., 2007) (1944). In addition to abridging economic freedom, 
central planning will inevitably metastasize to political freedom. 
51 MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 4 (1962). 
52 The mutual exclusivity of collectivism and individualism is a manifestation of the 
same “disjunctive tension between self-interest and the common good” mentioned in Part 
I.B. 
53 FRIEDMAN, supra note 51, at 10. 
54 Cf. DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A 
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 7 (1991). 
55 Charles K. Rowley, Public Choice and Constitutional Political Economy, in 
READINGS IN PUBLIC CHOICE AND CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 1, 6 (Charles 
K. Rowley & Friedrich Schneider eds., 2008); see ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC 
THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957). 
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groups pursue legislative instruments that bestow preferential 
government treatment. The sought after legislative instruments 
themselves are supplied by “individuals who do not find it cost 
effective to resist having their wealth taken away. . . . The supply of 
legislation is, therefore, grounded in the unorganized or relatively 
less-organized members of society.”56 Notably, what distinguishes 
those who supply favorable legislation from those that receive its 
benefits is organizational mode.57 
Political environment thus approximates a market where legislation 
is “a good demanded and supplied much as other goods,” supplied by 
society and demanded by interest groups.58 Yet, unlike the economic 
environment, there is no automatic price-mechanism to match 
potential buyers and sellers in the political environment. That role is 
filled by self-interested politicians and bureaucrats endeavoring to 
maximize their likelihood of reelection by brokering legislative 
articles for political groups in exchange for political support in the 
form of votes, money, and publicity.59 The central thesis of the 
economic theory of legislation is that interest “[g]roups compete 
within the context of rules that translate expenditures on political 
pressure into political influence and access to political resources.”60 
In the end, preferred organizational mode can vary depending on 
activity and context. Political institutional environments seem to favor 
centralized organization: both and political parties and interest groups 
serve centralizing functions, and emerged to overcome inherent 
difficulties in decentralized political activity. In a decentralized 
political arrangement, parties facilitate political activity; likewise, 
interest groups also facilitate political activity, but more narrowly “to 
take advantage of rational ignorance within the legislature, through 
the mechanism of persuasive campaign contributions, to obtain 
advantages for their members more than commensurate with their 
	
56 Robert D. Tollison, Public Choice and Legislation, 74 VA. L. REV. 339, 343 (1988). 
57 Interest group organization is frustrated by free-riders enjoying the benefits derived 
from successful lobbying without having to contribute. This is why small disciplined 
groups are the most successful. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE 
ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965). 
58 Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the 
Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 265 (1982). Accordingly, “legislative protection 
flows to those groups that derive the greatest value from it, regardless of overall social 
welfare.” Id. 
59 Jonathan R. Macey, Public Choice: The Theory of the Firm and the Theory of Market 
Exchange, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 43, 45–46 (1988). 
60 Gary Becker, Political Behavior, in CAPITALISM AND DEMOCRACY: SCHUMPETER 
REVISITED 120, 124 (Richard D. Coe & Charles K. Wilbur eds., 1985). 
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relative voting strength.”61 In a centralized arrangement, 
notwithstanding interest groups, there is only one political party—
accordingly, it is reasonable to expect hierarchies to legislate more 
coherently and more quickly than their decentralized counterpart. The 
downside of such expediency is the loss of protection for unpopular 
minorities. With this economic-political institutional-organizational 
framework articulated, it is applied to China and the United States. 
B. China 
A thorny obstacle to setting up the scaffolding of a comprehensive 
institutional matrix is translating unfamiliar cultural and social norms. 
An apposite example is the distinction between Chinese and 
American constitutionalism, viz., the role of a constitution with 
respect to adherence to the rule of law. Unlike the constitution of the 
United States, China’s constitution is not an ultimate legal authority, 
but a legitimizing instrument “embod[ying] or expressi[ng] . . . the 
current policies and thought of the Communist Party.”62 This 
perspective corresponds with China’s volatile constitutional history––
including the current 1982 incarnation, China has had four different 
constitutions.63 Notwithstanding the lack of legal supremacy, China’s 
constitution outlines institutional structure and organization of the 
state,64 and also provides insight into the Communist Party of China, 
which dominates modern China’s governance, society, and economy. 
Some of the fundamental differences between Chinese and 
American institutions are explicated, at least in part, by briefly 
mentioning watershed historical events. Chronologically, the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) was founded in 1949 after Mao Zedong and 
the Communist Party of China (CPC) defeated Chiang Kai-Shek and 
	
61 Rowley, supra note 55, at 14. 
62 DANIEL C.K. CHOW, THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 71 
(2003). A second example is that China does not have a separation of powers doctrine like 
that in the United States. 
63 Id. at 71–72. Earlier constitutions were adopted in 1954, 1975, and 1978. Id. at 72–
74. The 1982 constitution was subsequently amended four times 1988, 1993, 1999, and 
2004. 
64 The preamble to the 1982 constitution formally endorsed “four cardinal principles” 
that form the political core of Deng’s economic theory “socialism with Chinese 
characteristics.” WILLIAM A. JOSEPH, POLITICS IN CHINA: AN INTRODUCTION 156 (2010). 
The four principles require upholding: (1) the socialist path; (2) the people’s democratic 
dictatorship; (3) the leadership of the CPC; and (4) Marxism-Leninism and Maoism. Id. 
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the Nationalist Party in the Chinese civil war.65 From 1949 to 1978, 
China’s institutional environment was unequivocally centralized: the 
state owned all property and directed all enterprise. During most of 
his lifetime, Mao and the CPC exercised unchecked power over the 
country. The most notorious example of central economic planning 
was Mao’s “Great Leap Forward” from 1958 to 1961, which 
centralized rural farming activity and killed 20 to 30 million Chinese 
citizens by starvation.66 
In response to the failed practices of the Great Leap Forward, 
Mao’s influence waned as more rational economic policies were 
required to return China’s economic productivity to pre-Great Leap 
levels.67 In order to reconsolidate power and destroy his political 
enemies, Mao followed the Great Leap with a Marxist “Cultural 
Revolution,” which placed the country into perpetual revolution: the 
judiciary was abolished and a campaign of state-led terror lasted from 
1966 until Mao’s death ten years later.68 
Mao was succeeded by the economic reformer Deng Xiaoping, 
who steered China away from revolution and towards modernization 
and economic development by implementing “socialism with Chinese 
characteristics.”69 Deng’s theory was codified in the 1982 
constitution, which, along with subsequent amendments, evince a 
tension between the drive towards economic modernization and 
ideological socialist roots. 
The People’s Republic of China proclaims itself to be a unitary, 
socialist, democratic dictatorship under the leadership of the CPC.70 
To maintain the appearance of legitimacy, the “PRC constitution vests 
power and authority in the political and administrative structures that 
form the lawful government of China; the exercise of power through 
these structures is the legitimate exercise of power.”71 However, there 
is a frequent and pronounced difference between formal organization 
and reality. 
	
65 The revolution of 1949 is one of “two historic leaps” of China’s history. See HENRY 
YUHUAI HE, DICTIONARY OF THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF 
CHINA 238 (2003). 
66 CHOW, supra note 62, at 15. 
67 Id. at 16. 
68 Id. The Cultural Revolution killed or maimed 1,400,000 perceived opponents. Id. at 
21. 
69 Deng’s reforms of 1978 are the second “historic leap[]” in Chinese history. HE, supra 
note 65, at 238. 
70 XIANFA [CONSTITUTION] Dec. 4, 1982, pmbl. (China). 
71 CHOW, supra note 62, at 115. 
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Unpacking the PRC’s governance, political, and economic 
institutions individually provides a much clearer picture of their 
structure and operation in practice. Broadly, the organization of 
Chinese governance is centralized.72 The most obvious example of 
centralization is the principle of “democratic centrism” set forth in 
Article three of the 1982 constitution. The tenets of democratic 
centrism are: “the individual is subordinate to the group, the minority 
is subordinate to the majority, lower level authorities are subordinate 
to higher level authorities, and local authorities are subordinate to 
central level authorities.”73 Thus, all sovereign power resides at the 
peak of the central unitary state. 
In accordance with the principle of democratic centrism, the peak 
of the state power pyramid according to the constitution—de jure 
government—is the National People’s Congress (NPC), which is 
China’s unicameral national legislature.74 The NPC consists of several 
thousand members whose actual influence is somewhat limited, as the 
real direction comes from the Standing Committee of the NPC. 
According to the PRC constitution, the Standing Committee is 
supposed to be the second highest organ of state power, and can 
exercise almost the same powers as the NPC.75 Internal organization 
of the Standing Committee is similarly centralized, and led by a 
Council of Chairmen, which “[directs] the work of” and “handle[s] 
the important day-today work of the Standing Committee.”76 
Likewise, subnational government is vertically integrated under the 
NPC with local people’s congresses typically organized at provincial, 
county, and township levels. In theory, state power is legitimized 
through the people’s congresses, where township and county 
congresses are elected democratically, and provincial and national 
congresses being elected by the directly subordinate congress. 
Republican legitimacy thus appears to be granted by lower level 
congresses and to flow upward. 
	
72 E.g., Xiaobo Zhang, Fiscal Decentralization and Political Centralization in China: 
Implications for Growth and Inequality, 34 J. COMP. ECON. 713 (2005). 
73 CHOW, supra note 62, at 86. 
74 XIANFA Dec. 4, 1982 art. 2 (China). The people’s congresses are “[t]he organs 
through which the people exercise state power are the National People’s Congress and the 
local people’s congresses at different levels.” Id. Other constitutional structures are 
subordinate to the NPC: the Presidency; the State Council, or the administrative arm; the 
Supreme People’s Court and Procuratorate, or the judicial and prosecutorial arms; and the 
Central Military Commission, which controls the People’s Liberation Army (“PLA”). 
75 Id. at art. 67. 
76 Id. at art. 68. 
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Structurally, the CPC is analogous to the NPC. Internally, the 
highest organ of party authority is the national party conference, 
which is convened approximately every five years. Carrying the NPC 
analogy further, the Central Committee of the CPC controls important 
national decisions.77 However, the most powerful institutions of the 
CPC are the Politburo and its Standing Committee (PSC).78 The PSC 
in particular is China’s most senior decision-making body, and its 
membership is determined by “horse trading among different 
constituencies, interest groups, and influential retired Party elders, 
whose interests they represent informally on the PSC.”79 Indeed, the 
principal intra-party between populists and princelings has evolved 
into an institution referred to as “one party, two coalitions,” which 
serves as a check on unilateral decision-making.80 
Subnational organization of the CPC is also analogous to the 
subnational organization of the NPC. In fact, maintaining parallel 
structures to the closest degree possible allows the CPC and NPC to 
fuse at certain critical nodes where the same person occupies key 
positions in both official government and unofficial party capacities. 
The result is that the party and government apparatuses are parallel 
and interlocking, and give the appearance that government and 
political power are separated. 
Yet, as mentioned above, there is a disjunction between de jure and 
de facto government. Contrary to the legitimate exercise of power 
according to the 1982 constitution, the “real locus of power”—de 
facto government—takes place behind-the-scenes. Officially, the CPC 
is not an organ of state power, but is a political organization 
subordinate to the PRC constitution.81 Unofficially, the CPC 
influences and controls the PRC government by installing top party 
leaders in leading government positions and by distributing party 
	
77 The PRC constitution grants the national party conference and the Central 
Committee almost identical powers. 
78 SUSAN V. LAWRENCE & MICHAEL F. MARTIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
UNDERSTANDING CHINA’S POLITICAL SYSTEM 4 (May 10, 2012). 
79 Id. at 3. “PSC decision-making, then, is believed to involve considerable bargaining 
and maneuvering for factional advantage.” Id. (footnote omitted). The presence of such 
bargaining is evidence that the CPC is not ideologically monolithic. 
80 Chen Li, Viewpoint: The Powerful Factions Among China’s Rulers, BRIT. BROAD. 
CO., Nov. 5, 2012, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-20203937 
(last visited Feb 18, 2013). 
81  XIANFA Dec. 4, 1982 art. 5 (China) (“No organization or individual may enjoy the 
privilege of being above the Constitution and the law.”). 
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members throughout the de jure government apparatus.82 More 
narrowly, the state and party merge to allow the CPC to exercise 
power through its control of government organs. In other words, the 
purpose of de jure governance in PRC is to legitimize de facto 
governance by the CPC. 
In reality, the purpose of the du jure government structure exists to 
legitimize and shroud de facto governance by the CPC. The CPC is 
cautious not to usurp the legitimacy of state power because as long as 
the party’s exercise of power is legitimized and ratified by the state, 
then challenging the CPC amounts to challenging the government and 
may justify the use of force. Stripped bare, China’s legitimization 
regime is a poorly disguised mechanism of social control.83 
Perhaps the sole exception to China’s preference for centralization 
is in the economic realm. Notwithstanding constitutional provisions 
which lodge ownership over the means of production with the public, 
and call for the “leading [economic] force” to be State Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs),84 China has gradually moved towards economic 
liberalization. For example, agricultural activity was decollectivized, 
SOEs were freed from strict government control, and private 
enterprise was permitted.  
China’s adoption of a hybrid or mixed economy is most clearly 
signaled by the pronounced growth of private enterprise, especially in 
rural areas. Accelerating rural modernization is due, in part, to the 
Township-Village-Enterprise (TVE) paradigm. TVEs are a locational 
concept, referring to business endeavors, both publically and privately 
owned, that are physically located outside of cities.85 Generally, 
private TVEs were smaller and more productive than their public 
counterparts. Arguably, TVEs are a Chinese manifestation of 
	
82 For largely historical reasons, the CPC views itself as the destined leader of the PRC. 
“In the more than 2,000 years of Chinese history . . . no ruling government of mainland 
China has ever voluntarily relinquished or transferred power to a succeeding government. 
No succeeding government has ever assumed power without destroying the presiding 
government.” CHOW, supra note 62, at 117; see supra notes 63–69 and related text. 
83 For example, China combines the posts of general secretary of the CPC, the PRC 
presidency, and the chairman of the CMC into one “paramount leader” in order to 
maintain control over the PLA. The most notorious example of justifying the use of force 
to quell dissent occurred in 1989 in Tiananmen Square. 
84  XIANFA Dec. 4, 1982 arts. 6–7 (China). 
85 YASHENG HUANG, CAPITALISM WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS 
ENTREPRENEUASHIP AND THE STAFF 77 (2008). The majority of TVEs are private 
enterprises. 
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federalism by leveraging information differentials between local and 
central governments.86 
The rest of China’s economic organization is a hybrid arrangement 
dubbed market-socialism. According to China’s 1982 constitution, 
ownership of the means of production with the public, and the 
“leading force” of China’s national economy is the driven by state 
owned enterprises (“SOEs”). China’s gradual economic liberalization. 
Specifically, agricultural activity was decollectivized, state owned 
enterprises were freed from strict government control, privately 
owned enterprises were allowed for the first time, and barriers to 
foreign direct investment were lifted.87 These reforms, along with 
increased protection for private property led to China’s economic 
dynamism.88 China’s transition to a mixed economy has been marked 
by unprecedented economic growth at a rate of 10% per annum for 
the past thirty years. 
One final note about China’s relatively underdeveloped legal 
institutions. The rule of law and protection of private property are 
prerequisites of a decentralized economic system, yet adherence to the 
rule of law and private property are still developing within the PRC. 
For example, the most recent appointment to the highest post of the 
Supreme People’s Court was nominated despite not having any legal 
training because he was expected to subordinate the constitution to 
the leadership interest of the CPC.89 The significance of weak legal 
institutions is that they inject uncertainty into contracting: people 
cannot predict what the outcome will be. Thus, Xianfa pays lip 
service to the rule of law and purports to establish a constitutional 
democracy, but actually cements the CPC, and especially the PSC, at 
the head of China’s de facto regime. 
	
86 Cf. Barry R. Weingast, The Performance and Stability of Federalism: An 
Institutional Perspective, in THE HANDBOOK OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 149 
(Claude Ménard & Mary M. Shirley eds., 2005). 
87 CHOW, supra note 62, at 36–37. However, Chinese flirtation with Western ideology 
doesn’t necessarily indicate a shift in CPC orthodoxy; rather, it merely suggests 
experimentation with alternative organizational modes. 
88 HUANG, supra note 85, at 55. The “country grew because of private-sector 
dynamism, a relatively supporting financial environment, and increasing property rights 
security.” Id. 
89 See Jerome A Cohen, China’s Reform Era Legal Odyssey, FAR E. ECON. REV., Dec. 
2008, at 34. 
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C. The United States 
Since its ratification in 1789, the United States Constitution has 
operated as “the supreme law of the land” in both theory and 
practice.90 The organization and operation of its features is the subject 
of voluminous scholarship, and need not be recounted here.91 One 
benefit of such a wealth of scholarship is that it has produced 
economic models of American institutions of governance and politics. 
The research program of Constitutional Political Economy (CPE) 
applies economics to ex ante constitutional decision-making and 
notably provided an economic justification for constitutionalism.92 
Complimenting CPE’s economic explanation of how constitutional 
governance structures emerge is the research program of Public 
Choice. Public Choice “offer[s] a positive theory of how politics 
works . . . under different sets of postulated rules and institutions.”93 
Both CPE and Public Choice consider transaction costs and the 
economic behavior in non-market decision-making, but at different 
times. CPE focuses on competitive political activity during pre-
constitutional drafting; Public Choice, on the other hand, focuses on 
post-constitutional political competition. These economic 
perspectives conveniently frame the U.S. institutional matrix in terms 
of rational decisions by self-interested actors both before and after 
constitutional adoption process. 
While the American form of government has existed for well over 
200 years, it is frequently taken for granted that the founding fathers 
struggled with how to “combin[e] the requisite stability and energy in 
government, with the inviolable attention due to liberty and to the 
republican form.”94 The enduring solution reached by the Framers is 
the separation of powers doctrine that admitted “national 
	
90 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
91 E.g., ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA vol. I–IV (James T. 
Schleifer trans., Eduardo Nolla ed., 2010) (1835). 
92 See, e.g., OLSON, supra note 57; JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE 
CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 
(1962). 
93 Geoffrey Brennan & James M. Buchanan, The Reason of Rules: Constitutional 
Political Economy 94 (1985), in 10 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES M. BUCHANAN 
(2000). 
94 THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 181 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James 
McClellan eds., 2001). The framers emphasis on stability is consistent with the NIE 
premise that a chief purpose of (governance) institutions is uncertainty minimization. 
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representatives may be prone to the influence of ‘interests’ that are 
inconsistent with the public welfare.”95 
The two chief interests that worried the Framers––”factions” and 
“self-love”96––both reflect the assumption “that self-interestedness 
would be the dominant motivating force in human nature often 
enough so that their failure to embrace the assumption would have 
disastrous effects on post-constitutional America.”97 In order to avoid 
becoming “a spectacle[] of turbulence and contention”98 like previous 
experiments in democracy, the Framers borrowed the more realistic 
assumptions of human nature used in economics.99 
Carrying the economic model one step further, assuming post-
constitutional activity was guided by the same rational self-interest 
that drives economic activity, the Framers concluded they must 
structure government to channel political self-interest and interest 
group opportunism towards socially desirable ends:100 “Ambition 
must be made to counteract ambition.”101 Broadly, political self-
interest manifests itself in the post-constitutional environment as 
interest groups seeking to appropriate wealth from the society as a 
whole. Accepting the inescapability of self-interested activity, the 
Framers knew that the temptation to compel transactions by 
government coercion would draw actors from the realm of mutually 
voluntary economic exchange. Accordingly, the constitution was 
designed to discourage legislative wealth transfers and to steer self-
interested activity to the economic sphere. 
The channeling objective was accomplished by raising the 
legislative transaction costs interest groups pay to acquire wealth 
through government-transfers relative to the costs of consensual 
market transactions. Mechanistically, the transaction costs of 
	
95 Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 43 
(1986). 
96 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 94, at 43 (James Madison). Factions are groups 
of citizens “united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, 
adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the 
community.” Id. 
97 Jonathan R. Macey, Competing Economic Views of the Constitution, 56 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 50, 55 (1988). 
98 The Federalist NO. 10, supra note 94, at 46 (James Madison). 
99 In particular, the Framers incorporated the notion that rational self-interested actors 
engaging in consensual and mutually beneficial transactions can be incentivized to 
facilitate a common good. Cf. IV ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND 
CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 421 (Edwin Cannan ed., 1904) (1776). 
100 Macey, supra note 97, at 55–56. 
101 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 94, at 268 (James Madison). 
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legislation––bicameral approval, enacted by the executive, and not 
invalidated by the judiciary––are intended to channel self-interested 
behavior away from politics and towards private economic 
ordering.102 In short, the separation of powers doctrine protects 
minorities from oppression by the majority, and protects the majority 
from depredation by opportunistic minorities.103 This is the first 
critical distinction—structural—between China’s and the United 
States’ constitutions: Xianfa has no separation of powers principle, 
but promotes centralization. 
Federalism itself serves two important interests: broadly, an 
expansive and diverse federal republic helps to prevent “a gradual 
concentration of the several powers in the same department.”104 
Further, federalism facilitates experimentation with democracy at the 
state level, the combination of which with political freedom allows 
for the expression of, and experimentation with unpopular ideas.105 
Decentralization of federalism also leverages the intrinsic information 
differential between national and subnational governments.106 
Arguably, China’s TVE paradigm is experimentation to realize the 
benefits conferred by decentralization. 
The second critical distinction between China’s and the United 
States constitutions concerns resultant ex post political activity. 
Unlike China, United States constitution provides for and protects a 
multiplicity of political parties; yet, for most of the nation’s existence, 
two parties have dominated politics in the United States.107 In 
contrast, while China is a one party state, there are two competing 
coalitions within the CPC. Thus, in both systems, decisions are 
ultimately the result of two rival alliances within a larger monolithic 
	
102 Id. at 43–45. Likewise, supermajoritarian requirements for constitutional 
amendment drive transaction costs even higher because the constitutional amendment 
provides the highest level of legal protection. 
103 “The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same 
hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, 
may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra 
note 92, at 249 (James Madison). 
104 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 94, at 268 (James Madison). 
105 See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 92–93 (2d ed. 1863) (“Truth, in the great 
practical concerns of life, is so much a question of the reconciling and combining of 
opposites . . . to be made by the rough process of a struggle between combatants fighting 
under hostile banners.”). 
106 See Friedrich A. Hayek, The Economic Conditions of Interstate Federalism, in 
INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER 255 (Friedrich A. Hayek ed., 1948). 
107 The two-party political landscape is a consequence of the chosen electoral 
apparatus: first-past-the-post plurality. See MAURICE DUVERGER, POLITICAL PARTIES: 
THEIR ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITY IN THE MODERN STATE bk. 2, ch. 1 (1963). 
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political order: the difference is that the United States provides greater 
freedoms of association and speech. 
Finally, the third critical distinction relates to legal institutions and 
adherence to the rule of law. Broadly, “[t]he constitutional function of 
the [U.S. Supreme] Court is to define values and proclaim principles,” 
but “there is a tension between principle and expediency” in the 
exercise of judicial review.108 Accordingly, the Court is the 
“institution charged with the evolution and application of society’s 
fundamental principles.”109 Specifically, the United States is a 
common law jurisdiction where the separation of powers principle 
separates the judiciary from the legislative and executive branches, 
which consequently provides “more protection against predation by 
the state and leads to more freedom than code or civil law.”110 
Compared to China’s lack of independent judiciary, weak property 
rights, and inconsistent commitment to the rule of law, it is fair to say 
the greater certainty provided by American legal institutions would 
endow the United States with an economic advantage. 
III 
COMPARATIVE EFFICACY OF POLICY RESPONSES 
Because American institutions of governance, politics, and 
economic activity make more complete use of knowledge, everything 
else being equal, we expect the American institutional response to 
utilize knowledge more fully, and return to stable economic growth 
and low unemployment, or at least more quickly than would China’s 
top-down solution. Yet, China’s response was more timely, coherent, 
and effective. The rest of Part III describes (A) each country’s policy 
and (B) evaluates their efficacy. 
A. Policies 
Both countries passed stimulus plans, which is probative inasmuch 
as it indicates prevailing macroeconomic policy of each government. 
Specifically, each country adopted Keynesian stimulus packages, 
which indicates both China and the United States agreed that 
expansionary fiscal and monetary policies were the solution to spur 
	
108 ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 68 (2d ed., Yale Univ. 
Press 1986) (1962). 
109 Id. at 109. 
110 Paul H. Rubin, Legal Systems as Frameworks for Market Exchanges, in HANDBOOK 
OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 205, 220 (Claude Ménard & Mary M. Shirley eds., 
2005). 
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domestic demand.111 This section seeks to highlight the many 
structural similarities and shared objectives between the two lawful 
government responses to the financial collapse. 
1. China’s Response 
In November 2008, amid much fanfare, China announced a four 
trillion RMB stimulus package designed to “further expand domestic 
demand and assure stable rapid growth.”112 While only two trillion 
represented previously unplanned stimulatory spending, China’s plan 
was still the third largest proportional expenditure of GDP in world.113 
The details of the Chinese plan were disseminated using party, rather 
than state, channels, and were promulgated in the form of ten 
directives enumerated in Central Document Number Eighteen of 2008 
(Document 18).114 Those directives were: (1) acceleration of housing 
construction; (2) increasing essential services, and acceleration of 
infrastructure repair in rural areas; (3) expansion of mass transit 
infrastructure; (4) expansion and a more equal distribution of quality 
health care and education; (5) conservation of energy, and ecological 
resources; (6) industrial and technological innovation; (7) accelerate 
reconstruction of areas damaged by the Sichuan earthquake; (8) 
increasing income and quality of life in both urban and rural areas, 
thereby increasing consumption, stimulating the economy, and 
promoting social harmony and stability; (9) experimental Value 
Added Tax (VAT) reform; and (10) expansion of available bank 
credit to promote economic growth.115 
Organizationally, the majority of the Chinese plan deals with 
infrastructure investment: directives one through six target specific 
areas for investment; and directive ten provides funding for the 
	
111 See JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, 
INTEREST, AND MONEY 129 (Palgrave-Macmillan 2007) (1936) (“If the Treasury were to 
fill old bottles with banknotes, bury them at suitable depths in disused coalmines which are 
then filled up to the surface . . . there need be no more unemployment . . . .”). 
112 Barry Naughton, Understanding the Chinese Stimulus Package, 28 CHINA 
LEADERSHIP MONITOR 1, 2 (2009), available at http://media.hoover.org/documents 
/CLM28BN.pdf. 
113 Adam McKissack & Jessica Y. Xu, Chinese Macroeconomic Management Through 
the Crisis and Beyond, ASIAN-PACIFIC ECON. LIT. 43, 47 (2011). 
114 Naughton, supra note 112, at 2. 
115 Liu Zebang, Document No. 18 of the CPC Central Committee (Nov. 26, 2008), 
available at http://liuzebang.2000.blog.163.com/blog/static/42248892008102644556842/ 
(Chinese); see China Plans 10 Major Steps to Spark Growth as Fiscal, Monetary Policies 
Ease, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY (Nov. 9, 2008), available at http://news.xinhuanet.com 
/english/2008-11/09/content_10332422.htm. 
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stimulus. The remaining directives satisfy related social or political 
objectives of the CPC: Directive seven deals with the Sichuan 
earthquake; directive eight addresses long-standing anxiety about 
wealth inequality between urban and rural China, and directive nine 
experiments with tax reform. China’s plan is remarkably coherent. 
Mechanistically, Document 18 communicated to provincial 
governments what types of projects the central government wanted to 
fund, thereby initiating a three-step negotiation process similar to the 
one used under the Chinese planned economy.116 In step two, 
provinces responded by submitting a “wish-list”117 of projects for 
consideration to the National Development and Reform Commission 
(NDRC).118 Finally, NDRC pared the provincial wish-lists down in 
step three to the proposals that best accomplished the CPC’s desired 
policy goals, authorized those plans, and issued “block-grants” for 
approved projects. 
In total, the central government funded half the approved projects 
to the tune of 600 billion RMB, and provinces were expected to foot 
the other half the bill. However, the provinces only had around 300 
billion RMB. The solution came from expansionary fiscal policies, 
increased municipal and corporate bond issuance, and long-term low-
interest loans. 
2. United States’ Response 
In frenzied response to the financial collapse, Congress passed 
several articles of fiscal legislation. In chronological order of 
enactment, they include the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act 
(EESA),119 Tax Extenders and Alternative Minimum Tax Relief Act 
(TEAMTRA),120 the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
(ARRA),121 the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act (FERA),122 The 
	
116 Naughton, supra note 112, at 3. 
117 Other than an implicit promise to pay a portion of a project’s cost, provinces have 
nothing to lose by proposing more projects than could be funded. Id. Accordingly, the 
proposed “wish-lists” for the 2008 stimulus plan would have cost over eighty percent of 
China’s annual GDP if fully funded. Id. at 3. 
118 Id. at 2. The NDRC is an agency of the State Council. 
119 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, div. A, 122 
Stat. 3765 (2008). 
120 Tax Extenders and Alternative Minimum Tax Relief Act, Pub. L. No. 110-343, div. 
C, 122 Stat. 3861 (2008). 
121 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 
115 (2009), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-111publ5/pdf/PLAW-111 
publ5.pdf; see S. REP. NO. 111-3 (2009), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin 
/cpquery/e?cp111:FLD010:@1(52003). 
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Helping Families Save Their Homes Act (HFSTH),123 the Homeless 
Emergency Assistance and Rapid Transition to Housing Act 
(HEARTH),124 and the Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance 
Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act (TRUIRJCA).125 
First, EESA was the statutory framework for the Troubled Asset 
Relief Program (TARP), meant to remedy liquidity shortages and 
financial instability. A widely criticized legislative article, TARP’s 
charter authorized the purchase of up to $700 billion of troubled 
assets126 with an expected cost to tax payers of $300 billion. TARP 
acquired troubled assets through a wide variety of different 
programs,127 the most reviled of which was the AIG Investments and 
the Automotive Industry Financing Program, as they represent 
billion-dollar bailouts of private industry. In more detail, AIG 
received $85 billion in taxpayer-funded assistance and was transferred 
to government stewardship.128 Similarly, the Treasury provided $49.5 
billion in assistance to GM.129 
	
122 Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617 
(2009), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-111publ21/pdf/PLAW-111 
publ21.pdf. 
123 Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-22, div. A, 123 
Stat.1632 (2009), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-111publ22/pdf 
/PLAW-111publ22.pdf. 
124 Homeless Emergency Assistance and Rapid Transition to Housing Act of 2009, 
Pub. L. No. 111-22, div. B, 123 Stat. 1663 (2009), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys 
/pkg/PLAW-111publ22/pdf/PLAW-111publ22.pdf. 
125 Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-312, 124 Stat. 3296 (2010), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys 
/pkg/PLAW-111publ312/pdf/PLAW-111publ312.pdf. 
126 Troubled assets are defined as “residential or commercial mortgages and any 
securities, obligations, or other instruments that are based on or related to such mortgages, 
that in each case was originated or issued on or before March 14, 2008, the purchase of 
which the Secretary determines promotes financial market stability.” Emergency 
Economic Stabilization Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5202(9)(A). More broadly, troubled assets can 
include “any other financial instrument that the Secretary, after consultation with the 
Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, determines the 
purchase of which is necessary to promote financial market stability, but only upon 
transmittal of such determination, in writing, to the appropriate committees of Congress.” 
Id. § 5202(9)(B). This amount was later reduced to $475 billion by Dodd-Frank. 
127 OFF. OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR 2012 ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES 33–
37 (2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2012 
/assets/spec.pdf. 
128 Id. at 33. 
129 Id. at 35. 
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Next, TEAMTRA provided $98.7 billion in tax credits to 
businesses and the middle class,130 under the Keynesian theory that 
providing households with additional income would spur 
consumption. Four and a half months after TEAMTRA came a 
sprawling legislative article seen by many as the face of U.S. recovery 
efforts, the ARRA. Designed to “directly increase aggregate 
demand,”131 the ARRA sought to offset reductions in private spending 
and private investment with government infrastructure investment, 
thereby stimulating economic activity. The Act itself allocated (1) 
$282 billion in tax benefits; (2) $274 billion in infrastructure 
development; and (3) $284 billion in social security programs.132 
After the ARRA came FERA, which merely provided for the 
establishment of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC), “to 
examine the causes, domestic and global, of the current financial and 
economic crisis in the United States.”133 
Finally, TRUIRJCA, extended tax relief provisions to 2012.  
Specifically, provisions of both the Economic Growth and Tax Relief 
Reconciliation Act of 2001,134 and the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief 
Reconciliation Act of 2003135 were extended, in addition to 
implementing new temporary provisions.136 Arguably, TRUIRJCA 
	
130 See JOINT CONG. COMM. ON TAXATION, ESTIMATED BUDGET EFFECTS OF THE 
“TAX EXTENDERS AND ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX RELIEF ACT OF 2008” (Sept. 23, 
2008), available at http://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=download&id=1269&chk 
=1269&no_html=1. TEAMTRA also demonstrates the influence of lobbying groups. See 
e.g., TEAMTRA, supra note 79, at 122 Stat. 3862 § 503 (providing an exemption from 
excise taxes for “certain wooden arrows designed for use by children”); id. at 122 Stat. 
3875 § 325 (extending funding to the “wool research fund”); see also infra Part IV. 
131 Frederic S. Mishkin, Over the Cliff: From the Subprime to the Global Financial 
Crisis, 25 J. ECON. PERSP. 49, 63 (2011). 
132 Recovery Accountability and Transparency Board, The Recovery Act, 
http://www.recovery.gov/About/Pages/The_Act.aspx (last visited Nov. 2, 2011); see 
Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 112-10, 
125 Stat. 38, div. B, Tit. VII (2011). 
133 See Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1625 § 
5(a) (2009). 
134 Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 
115 Stat. 38 (2001). 
135 Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, 117 
Stat. 752 (2003). 
136 See SENATE COMM. ON FIN., SUMMARY OF THE REID TAX RELIEF, 
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE REAUTHORIZATION AND JOB CREATION ACT OF 2010 
(2010), available at http://finance.senate.gov/legislation/download/?id=5598822b-8892     
-4445-b43a-4da7f0b991a0. 
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represents supply-side economic thought in ideological opposition to 
Keynsian spending provisions.137 
The monetary component to the American stimulus package was 
executed by the Federal Reserve (the Fed). The Fed consists of a 
seven-member board of governors, two of which are a chairperson 
and vice-chairperson, with both leaders and members appointed by 
the president and confirmed by the Senate for prescribed terms (four 
and fourteen years respectively). The Fed’s “policy decisions do not 
have to be approved by the President or anyone else in the executive 
or legislative branches of government.”138 Notably, the centralization 
of monetary policy in a central government entity suffers from many 
of the same afflictions of centralized economic policy.139 
In any event, since the Great Depression of the 1930s, the 
traditional role played by the Fed in preventing recessions has been 
the manipulation of interest rates and available credit.140 Indeed, these 
two measures are the primary tools for central banks to stimulate or 
cool their economies. For example, the vigorous slashing of interest 
rates coupled with monetary expansion credited with ending U.S. 
recessions in 1981, 1991, and 2001.141 However, central bank policy 
measures can lose the ability to generate consumer demand when the 
market will not “spend enough to use the economy’s capacity, even at 
zero interest rate.”142 
The Fed’s response began by lowering the federal funds target rate 
in late 2007, reaching the current target rate of 0 to 0.25% by the end 
of 2008.143 The Fed also loaned $400 billion directly to depository 
institutions, which had been enough to ease liquidity shortages in the 
past.144 However, providing FDIC insured depository institutions with 
	
137 See, e.g., Robert E. Lucas, Supply Side Economics: An Analytical Review, 42 
OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 293, 314 (2008) (estimating that “eliminating capital income 
taxation would increase capital stock by about 35 percent“). Of course, there were almost 
$300 billion in tax credits in the ARRA as well. 
138 Who Owns the Federal Reserve?, Board of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., 
http://www.federalreserve.gov /faqs/about_14986.htm (last updated Sept. 8, 2011), 
139 See Kent F. Davis, The Symbiosis Between Free Banking and Individual Liberty, 4 
MONETARY ECON. EJOURNAL, June 19, 2012, available at http://hq.ssrn.com/Journals 
/IssueProof.cfm?abstractid=2087338&journalid=1508851&issue_number=74&volume=4
&journal_type=CMBO&function=showissue#paper_2087338. 
140 PAUL KRUGMAN, THE RETURN OF DEPRESSION ECONOMICS AND THE CRISIS OF 
2008 at 173 (2009). 
141 Id. at 68. 
142 Id. at 71 (describing a liquidity trap). 
143 Mishkin, supra note 131, at 59. 
144 KRUGMAN, supra note 140, at 173. 
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credit would not alleviate the short-term credit needs of the “shadow” 
or “parallel” banking system.145 Ultimately, the Fed was unable to 
drive down commercial lending rates, despite cutting the federal 
funds rate to near zero; conventional monetary policies had lost 
traction on the real economy. 
Consequently, unorthodox monetary policies were needed. The Fed 
responded by expanding its balance sheet by buying large blocks of 
assets. Liquidity provision and asset purchases are also referred to as 
quantitative easing. In addition to the easing, the Fed also 
administered “stress tests” to the nineteen largest finance firms to 
ensure they had adequate common equity to survive further market 
deterioration. 
The first of these unorthodox policies, liquidity provision, works in 
the United States the same way it does in China: by increasing the 
availability of credit. Rather than manipulating bank reserve ratios, 
the Fed increases lending to banks, historically by lowering the 
federal funds discount rate.146 However, conventional means had 
already failed, and many banks resist direct borrowing from the Fed 
to avoid giving the appearance of desperation. Consequently, the Fed 
established the Term Auction Facility (TAF) to facilitate anonymous 
borrowing at the discount rate.147 The TAF successfully reduced the 
liquidity risk premium charged by increasingly strained monetary 
markets.148 
Similarly, the Primary Dealer Credit Facility provided liquidity by 
accepting securities as collateral for loans, disbursing over $8.9 
trillion between March 2008 and May 2009.149 One program 
stimulated demand for asset backed corporate paper in money market 
funds, providing the funds with much needed liquidity,150 while 
another established a secondary market for money market instruments 
	
145 Id. at 160–61. For a description of the shadow banking system, see id. at 158–60. 
146 Mishkin, supra note 131, at 59–60. 
147 Id. at 60. 
148 JAMES MCANDREWS, ASANI SARKAR & ZHENYU WANG, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK 
OF NY STAFF REPORTS, THE EFFECT OF THE TERM AUCTION FACILITY ON THE LONDON 
INTER-BANK OFFERED RATE 1–2 (July 2008), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org 
/research/staff_reports/sr335.pdf. 
149 See THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE, PRIMARY CREDIT 
DEALER FACILITY (Apr. 16, 2012), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/reform 
_pdcf.htm. 
150 See THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE, ASSET-BACKED 
COMMERCIAL PAPER MONEY MARKET MUTUAL FUND LIQUIDITY FACILITY (Feb. 5, 
2010), http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/abcpmmmf.htm. 
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to shore up liquidity vulnerability.151 Another program allowed 
financial institutions to borrow Treasury securities on a twenty-eight 
day term by offering mortgage-backed securities as collateral, thereby 
providing liquidity to institutions with toxic mortgage assets.152 The 
Fed’s last lending program provided funding for the purchase of 
commercial backed paper, thereby improving liquidity in short-term 
funding markets, and increasing global availability of credit.153 
In addition to the lending programs, the Fed conducted central 
bank liquidity swaps, providing foreign banks with U.S. dollar 
deposits in exchange for deposits in the foreign bank’s currency. The 
impetus for these credit swaps grew out of financial globalization; 
because investors in one country held substantial positions in another 
country, cross-border investments acted as “transmission 
mechanism[s].”154 Thus, credit line swaps were a necessary artery to 
infuse the global banking system with liquidity, especially because 
foreign financial institutions frequently need U.S. dollars. A variety of 
studies conclude that the Fed’s liquidity provision lowered interest 
rates, improved the performance of dollar swap markets, and reduced 
interbank risk premiums.155 
To prevent the massive influx of liquidity from becoming 
inflationary, the Fed discouraged financial institutions from lending 
the money by making asset purchases. The purchases effectively 
resulted in paying banks interest for not lending the recently infused 
liquidity. Between March and October 2009, the Fed purchased $300 
billion of long-term U.S. Treasury bonds in the hopes it would drive 
up their price, ultimately reducing interest rates charged to 
consumers.156 
Next, the Fed purchased $1.25 trillion of mortgage-backed 
securities between November 2008 and March 2010 for two 
reasons.157 First, letting the banks trade their toxic sub-prime 
	
151 THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE, MONEY MARKET 
INVESTOR FUNDING FACILITY (Feb. 5, 2010), http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetary 
policy/mmiff.htm. 
152 THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE, TERM SECURITIES 
LENDING FACILITY (Feb. 5, 2010), http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/tslf 
.htm. 
153 THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE, COMMERCIAL PAPER 
FUNDING FACILITY (Feb. 5, 2010), http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/cpff 
.htm. 
154 KRUGMAN, supra note 140, at 177. 
155 Mishkin, supra note 131, at 60–61 (citing studies). 
156 Id. at 61. 
157 Id. 
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mortgage-backed securities for cash alleviated any liquidity or reserve 
ratio concerns. Second, the purchase of mortgage-backed securities 
lowered long-term bond rates and residential mortgage rates, thereby 
stimulating the demand for housing and its construction.158 All told, 
the Fed purchased a total of $1.725 trillion of assets, roughly twelve 
percent of U.S. fourth quarter 2009 GDP. The asset purchase program 
is estimated to have pushed long-term interest rates on mortgages 
down by 52 basis points,159 “thereby having a substantial effect on 
residential mortgage rates.”160 
While the influx of liquidity stabilized the financial sector, large 
financial institutions were relatively low in capital as a consequence 
of the financial collapse, with the buffer to absorb losses being the 
hardest hit.161 In response the Fed developed the Supervisory Capital 
Assessment Program (SCAP), which began analysis of balance sheets 
for ability to weather adverse financial conditions.162 The analysis 
focused on the nineteen largest financial firms, comparing common 
equity to vulnerability, and became public mid-2009. This 
information was well received by markets, with investment pouring 
into the firms needing it the most, thereby providing the financial 
sector with an adequate buffer against financial stress. 
B. Efficacy 
There is a disjunction between expectations and observations: Both 
China and the United States want to restore stable economic growth; 
Both want minimal unemployment; both issued stimulus plans. 
China’s institutions are less free and presumably utilize knowledge 
less fully––therefore, we would expect the U.S. (institutional) 
response to be more effective. China’s response to the fiscal collapse 
was coordinated and effective. The Unites States’ response, on the 
other hand, was schizophrenic and hyper-partisan. Thus, dissimilar to 
the emphasis paid to the similarities of plans and their objectives in 
	
158 Id. 
159 JOSEPH GAGNON, MATTHEW RASKIN, JULIE REMACHE & BRIAN SACK, FEDERAL 
RESERVE BANK OF NY, LARGE SCALE ASSET PURCHASES BY THE FEDERAL RESERVE: 
DID THEY WORK? at 25 (Mar. 2010), available at http://www.ny.frb.org/research/staff 
_reports/sr441.pdf. 
160 Mishkin, supra note 131, at 61. 
161 BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, THE SUPERVISORY 
CAPITAL ASSESSMENT PROGRAM: DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION 2 (Apr. 24, 2009), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/bcreg20090424a1.pdf. 
162 Id. 
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Section A, this section highlights the difference in efficacy between 
the two superficially similar plans. 
1. China’s Success 
The coherence of the Chinese stimulus plan is particularly well 
demonstrated by Directive 8’s instruction to increase income and 
quality of life; it promotes the socialist goal of economic equality, 
thereby promoting social stability. Indeed, GDP per capita increased 
by an average of 10.64% per year from 2006 to 2010,163 growing from 
$2,069.34 (2011 U.S. dollars) to $4,428.46 during the same period.164  
While the per capita share of GDP fell from 7.63 ൈ 10ି଼	% to 
7.47 ൈ 10ି଼	% from 2006 to 2010, dropping an average of slightly 
more than half a percent a year,165 GDP rose an annual average of 
11.22% during the period in question.166 Thus, while an individual 
worker’s piece of the pie was getting smaller, the pie was growing 
over twenty times faster than the rate that the proportion received was 
diminishing, and the policy goal of increasing income was being 
furthered. 
While Directive 8 successfully raised per capita income, it was 
unable to improve the relative income inequality in China167; rather, it 
slowed the rate of decline. Quantitative examination of income 
inequality or quality of life is impaired by the unavailability of 
accurate statistics.168 Consequently, the Gini coefficient,169 relative 
	
163 THE WORLD BANK, GDP PER CAPITA GROWTH (ANNUAL %) (2011), http://data 
.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD.ZG. Compare to the average annual growth 
rate in the U.S. of 0±4% during the same period. Id. 
164 THE WORLD BANK, GDP PER CAPITA (CURRENT US$) (2011), http://data.world 
bank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD. Compare to the U.S., where GDP per capita 
actually fell by over $1000 in 2009, and in 2010 was only $228 greater than it was in 
2008. Id. 
165 Calculated by dividing GDP per capita, see id., by GDP, see THE WORLD BANK, 
GDP (CURRENT US$) (2011), http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD. 
166 THE WORLD BANK, GDP GROWTH (ANNUAL %) (2011), http://data.worldbank 
.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG. Compare to the U.S., where the average annual 
GDP growth fluctuated from -3.5% to 2.7%, averaging 0.82% annual growth, and the per 
capita share fell an average of 0.86% per year. See id.; supra note 121. 
167 See Ming Lu & Hong Gao, Labour Market Transition, Income Inequality and 
Economic Growth in China, 150 INT’L LAB. REV. 101 (2011). 
168 See Xiaolu Wang & Wing Thye Woo, The Size and Distribution of Hidden 
Household Income in China, 10 ASIAN ECON. PAPERS 1, 1 (2011) (“Official Chinese data 
on urban household income are seriously flawed because of significant underreporting of 
income by respondents and non-participation by the high income groups in official 
household surveys.”). 
169 The Gini coefficient is a statistical index of income concentration, measuring 
relative income equality; a high Gini coefficient reflects a high concentration of income.   
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income gaps, and other calculated measures are used as proxies.170  
As of 2010, a macroeconomist from the NDRC conceded China’s 
income inequality has grown continuously for a decade, and has 
“exceeded reasonable limits.”171 Because, “the key factor of income 
inequality comes from income disparity between rural and urban 
inhabitants,”172 part of the growing wealth inequality can be 
explicated by the high rate of urbanization observed in China - 3%.173 
But, considering the NDRC’s contention that a Gini coefficient of .47 
is dangerously high, and that the Central government was unable to 
curb the growing income gap, we can infer that the rate of 
urbanization was insufficient to offset the growing income disparity. 
Ergo, Directive 8’s income equalization objective went unachieved. 
Lastly, directive 8 attempted to develop domestic consumption to 
spur economic growth, thereby reducing Chinese reliance on exports. 
Again, the unavailability of reliable statistics results in the use of 
approximations. Officially, the central government claims that 
domestic retail sales grew 13% in 2008, 17% in 2009, and 18% in 
2010; similarly household consumption grew 9 per cent, 10 per cent, 
and 11 per cent in the same years.174 A broader and more objective 
metric, the proportion of international trade relative to Chinese GDP, 
declined from 71% of China’s GDP in 2006, to 55% in 2010.175 
	
If the Gini coefficient (G) is growing relative to time (T) such that డீడ் ൐ 0, then income 
inequality is growing as its concentration is increasing.  Therefore, a rising Gini coefficient 
indicates growing relative income inequality, but does not reflect levels of national or 
household wealth. Accordingly, it is possible to have a household’s absolute position 
improve, despite a falling relative position. 
170 Admittedly, the use of proxies results is a rough approximation at best. See 
JIANDONG CHEN ET AL., BROOKS WORLD POVERTY INSTITUTE, THE TREND OF THE GINI 
COEFFICIENT OF CHINA, 2 (2010), available at http://www.bwpi.manchester.ac.uk 
/resources/Working-Papers/bwpi-wp-10910.pdf (“[T]he main problem in calculating the 
Gini coefficient of Chinese residents’ income is the shortcomings of the data sources.”), 
171 China’s Wealth Gap is Approaching Social Tolerance “Red Line,” ECON. INFO. 
DAILY (China), May 10, 2010 (statement of Chang Xiuze), available at http://jjckb 
.xinhuanet.com/sdbd/2010-05/10/content_220612.htm. More recent reporting suggests that 
income inequality is still growing. See Most in China See Growing Income Inequality, 
PEW RES. CTR., http://www.pewresearch.org/daily-number/most-in-china-see-growing      
-income-inequality/ (Oct. 25, 2012). 
172 Chen, supra note 170, at 2. 
173 THE WORLD BANK, URBAN POPULATION GROWTH (Annual %) (2011), http://data 
.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.GROW. 
174 See WORLD BANK OFFICE, BEIJING, QUARTERLY UPDATE, 2 fig.2 (April 2011), 
available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP 
/IB/2011/04/29/000356161_20110429003758/Rendered/PDF/614000Replacem1Quarterly
1April12011.pdf [hereinafter CHINA QUARTERLY UPDATE APRIL 2011]. 
175 THE WORLD BANK, TRADE (% OF GDP) (2011), available at http://data.worldbank 
.org/indicator/NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS. Trade was at its lowest during 2009, at 49%. Id. 
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However, the GDP of China grew 50% during the same period, from 
2.2 trillion to 3.2 trillion, and the absolute value of trade during the 
same period stayed about the same, growing just 129 billion in 
constant 2000 dollars.176 In more detail, exports in China fell from 
39% of GDP in 2006 (980 billion constant 2000 U.S. dollars) to 30% 
of GDP in 2010 (1.467 trillion constant 2000 U.S. dollars).177 Imports 
fell to a lesser extent, dropping from 31% of GDP in 2006 (732 
billion constant U.S. dollars) to 26% of GDP in 2010 (1.084 trillion 
constant 2000 U.S. dollars).178 Notably, exports dropped a precipitous 
eight points in 2009, contributing just 27% to national GDP (1.143 
trillion constant 2000 U.S. dollars), falling by 10% that year.179  In 
contrast, imports also bottomed out in 2009 at 22% of GDP (903 
billion constant 2000 U.S. dollars), but still maintained positive 
annual growth at an uncharacteristically low 4%.180 
Notwithstanding the success of the Chinese plan, the growth of 
domestic retail sales and household consumption have slowed while 
inflation of the prices of raw commodities has risen.181 Moreover, 
“there are increasing signs of excess liquidity,” such as speculative 
investment and an emerging property price bubble.182 In response, the 
Central government raised the benchmark interest rate several times, 
reaching 6.56% in July 2011.183 Similarly, starting in 2009, the PBoC 
increased the 17.5% RRR multiple times, settling at 21.5% by mid-
	
176 See id.; THE WORLD BANK, GDP (CONSTANT 2000 US$) (2011), http://data.world 
bank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD. 
177 The World Bank, Exports of Goods and Services (% of GDP) (2011), http://data 
.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.EXP.GNFS.ZS; The World Bank, Exports of Goods and 
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178 The World Bank, Imports of Goods and Services (% of GDP) (2011), http://data 
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179 THE WORLD BANK, IMPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICES (ANNUAL % GROWTH) 
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180 THE WORLD BANK, IMPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICES (ANNUAL % GROWTH) 
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181 CHINA QUARTERLY UPDATE APRIL 2011, supra note 174 at 4, 8. 
182 McKissack & Xu, supra note 113, at 51. 
183 Kevin Yao and Aileen Wang, China Raises Rates, Shrugs off Slowing Growth, 
REUTERS (July 6 2011), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/06/china       
-economy-rates-idUSL3E7I61NQ20110706; China Raises Rates to Counter Inflation, 
BLOOMBERG (July 6, 2011), available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-07-06 
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2011, thereby sopping up excess liquidity.184 Consequently, the 
tightening of monetary and fiscal policies have reduced currency in 
circulation by almost a fifth in 2011,185 yet it is unclear whether China 
has beaten back inflation. To the contrary, despite China’s GDP 
continues growing at around 7.5%, real incomes grew at slower rate, 
and both GDP and income growth were outpaced by inflation by over 
400%.186 
Nevertheless, China’s stimulus plan demonstrated the utility of 
centralized arrangements: it was a model of inter-government 
cooperation, efficiency, and timeliness. However, this is not anything 
new: the principle advantage of centralization is the exercise of 
control. Based on available information, China’s stimulus plan 
quickly achieved objectives, including stable economic growth, 
minimized unemployment, and spurred domestic consumption. On 
the other hand, the lives of most Chinese did not improve with many 
of the infrastructure projects; instead, their lives got worse. Whether 
China’s stimulus was prudent in in the end will depend in no small 
measure on whether inflation and income inequality can be 
controlled. 
2. The United States’ Disappointment 
The FCIC released its report in January 2011, offering half a dozen 
conclusions, notably including the role inconsistent government 
policy played in fueling uncertainty and panic in financial markets.187 
This is consistent with the Austrian economic perspective: that the 
principal cause of financial and economic instability is government 
interposition with market function. Specifically, if stimulus funds are 
spent, then the provision of cheap credit results in inefficient 
investment, which, in turn, drives speculative bubbles.188 An 
important caveat: if the cheap credit is hoarded, then there would be 
no increase in domestic consumption, and therefore no inflation. 
	
184 See Bob Davis & Tom Orlik, China’s Move Shifts Growth to Top of Agenda, WALL 
ST. J. (Dec. 1, 2011), available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405297020 
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187 FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 
XXI (2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf. 
188 See Davis, supra note 139, at 10. 
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Congress estimated TRUIRJCA relieved tax burdens on families 
and businesses by $857 billion from 2011 to 2020.189 Likewise, 
ARRA relieved tax burdens by $300 billion, and was assessed as 
moderately successful.190 Unfortunately, outlays to households were 
largely saved, rather than spent.191 Outlays to states were similarly 
windfalls, and spurred consumption in the short-term, but not as much 
as infrastructure investment would have brought if the expenditures 
had avoided being whittled away under the continuous political 
pressure from parties and interest groups.192 
Notwithstanding high transaction costs, enormous amounts of 
resources have been consumed in interest group behavior. An 
example of the costs imposed upon society by such rent-seeking, two 
thirds of the stimulus spending was earmarked for inefficient use, and 
the remaining third was cramped and “painfully protracted” in 
execution.193 Worse, conservative estimates of taxpayer loss due to 
TARP come in at $19 billion.194 Not to mention the likelihood the 
cheap provision of credit only delayed an economic reckoning; rather 
than ameliorating the market disruption, the stimulus merely traded it 
for another bubble in the future. Arguably, we’re seeing signs of 
another bubble already with the return of mega mergers and 
acquisitions fueled by cheap credit.195 In the end, the American 
stimulus plan failed to achieve its objectives: economic growth is 
anemic, barely keeping rate with inflation, and high unemployment 
remains. 
	
189 JOINT CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, ESTIMATED BUDGET EFFECTS 
OF THE “TAX RELIEF, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE REAUTHORIZATION, AND JOBS 
CREATION ACT OF 2010 at 8 (Dec. 10, 2010), available at http://www.jct.gov/publications 
.html?func=startdown&id=3715. 
190 See, e.g., ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 19–24 (2011), available at 
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191 RICHARD POSNER, THE CRISIS OF CAPITALIST DEMOCRACY 114–15 (2010). 
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-29-TARP.pdf. 
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WALL ST. J., Feb. 14, 2013, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142412788 
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CONCLUSION AND INFERENCES 
One of the factors slowing the American economic recovery is 
political brinksmanship. The most egregious example is the debt-
ceiling debacle of 2011. Starting in the summer of that year, the 
United States Treasury announced that, unless the debt ceiling was 
raised, the United States would be unable to satisfy its debtor 
obligations. There was contentious debate in both houses of Congress 
about whether or not to raise the debt-ceiling, which was required to 
make interest payments on the outstanding $14 trillion in debt. What 
had previously been an un-contentious and non-partisan procedure 
mutated into sideshow, where extremes of the political spectrum 
hijacked the national dialogue with a false dichotomy.196 
In the more abstract phraseology of NIE, the transaction costs 
associated with American legislative activity have become 
excessively high. One possible explanation is the terrifying infusion 
of cash from super PACs—flush with anonymous and corporate 
donations—is the United States Supreme Court decision in Citizens 
United v. Federal Elections Committee.197 One part of the majority 
opinion that is undeniably correct is that money is the medium of 
political expression. That observation has profound consequences for 
the function of democracy. 
Money can be used to hijack the national political dialogue. In the 
case of the debt-ceiling debacle, seats in congress have become 
exponentially more valuable. Interest groups––PACs––are making 
record expenditures in political support––money in the form of 
donations. The result is that the high transaction costs appurtenant to 
the separation of powers are no longer high enough to channel self-
interested behavior away from political institutions. 
Regardless of whether empirical data exists to test such a bold 
proposition, it is logically sound. Syllogistically, high transaction 
costs in the political environment discourage self-interested political 
activity; the influx of resources in the political environment grew so 
much that legislative wealth transfers became profitable; therefore, 
the political environment has succumbed to the whims of interest 
groups and the interests of government have fallen out of alignment 
	
196 The crippling partisanship that allows the parties to maintain such uncompromising 
positions is a consequence of the two-party system, which is itself a consequence of the 
United States’ first-past-the-post electoral system. See William H. Riker, The Two-Party 
System and Duverger’s Law: An Essay on the History of Political Science, 76 AM. POL. 
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with the interest of its citizens. As evidence, the same over-hyped 
brinksmanship occurred once again over the automatic sequestration 
cuts that were adopted as part of the compromise from the 2011 debt-
ceiling debacle.  
In sum, China’s vertical integration undeniably produced a more 
efficacious stimulus plan than did the United States’ more 
decentralized governance organization. Indeed, it was the 
decentralized governance that contributed to relative delay and 
inefficacy of the American plan. Yet, the trade-off between China’s 
centralization and America’s decentralization is not limited to the 
timeliness and efficacy of policy response to an economic crisis. A 
corollary of the success of Chinese centralization is its arbitrary and 
capricious coercion against unpopular individuals and minorities. The 
PRC is notorious for human rights violations and its intolerance of 
dissent. The United States, by comparison, has a celebrated tradition 
of liberty and is one of the freest countries in the world. Arguably, 
one of the costs of that freedom is a less responsive legislative 
process, which is still vulnerable to opportunism. 
 
 
